We Call BTS “Bangdan” | Cultural Shifts in North Korea
By: Hannah Oh
Hannah is a North Korea-born intern at Liberty in North Korea’s Seoul office. This article has been reconstructed from her perspective based on DailyNK reports from March 2026.
⏱️ 30-second summary
- K-Pop Power: Young people in North Korea refer to BTS as “BT” to avoid attracting the attention of authorities. They empathize with song lyrics that touch their hearts, in sharp contrast to the ideology prescribed by the state. Even amidst strict crackdowns on South Korean media, people are consuming and sharing K-Pop with their peers.
- Resetting Relationships: It’s now common to see couples in North Korea spending time together in cafes, signaling a change in people’s daily lives. A new culture is emerging where people build relationships by sitting face-to-face over coffee and conversation.
- Expanding Self-Expression: New beauty standards that favor slim bodies and skincare have become popularized. As outside information spreads in North Korea, it’s gradually changing people’s tastes and self-expression.
BTS is a name recognized by people all over the world. This global K-Pop group’s music is even reaching audiences in the most closed country to exist today: North Korea.
The North Korean government severely cracks down on the consumption and spread of foreign media, like South Korean music and dramas. Through foreign media, North Koreans are able to learn things about the outside world that contradict and challenge the regime’s propaganda. In response, the regime passed the “anti-reactionary thought law” in December 2020, which made watching foreign media punishable by 15 years in a political prison camp.
To avoid being caught discussing and sharing about BTS, North Koreans are reportedly shortening the name to “BT.” Even though they cannot directly mention their favorite idol group, they are expressing their fandom by using slang that they understand among themselves.
Changes to daily life in North Korea extend beyond music tastes. From couples quietly conversing in cafes to women experimenting with K-Beauty, this article follows the stories of North Koreans who, despite control and restrictions, are shaping culture and cultivating new standards of leisure, beauty, and expression.
Why North Korean Youth Gravitate Towards K-Pop

It is reported that among young people in North Korea, it is common to refer to BTS, or “Bangtan,” as BT, or “Bangdan,” to avoid the scrutiny of North Korean authorities cracking down on illegal foreign media. Fans in North Korea have cited songs such as “I’m Fine,” “Go,” “Danger,” and “Spring Day” as their favorites, and expressed a desire to dress like the BTS members.
These developments might suggest that instead of foreign media being a taboo topic of discussion, it has become a language of taste shared among peers.
In response to the popularity of South Korean music, North Korean authorities imposed a city-wide lecture series that warned “The only love young people should pursue is revolutionary and comradely love.” However, after the lectures ended, it is reported that the sentiment among young people was that “South Korean song lyrics seem to understand my heart,” and “the emotions they actually feel” over “the emotions permitted by the state.”
Cuppaccinos Over Flowers: Dating Culture in North Korea

In North Korea, there is still a strong perception that cafes are places frequented only by the well-off. However, this year on March 8th for International Women’s Day, reports emerged of husbands visiting coffee shops with their wives, holding hands, and spending time drinking lattes or cappuccinos. Rather than traditional gestures like flowers or doing extra housework, there seems to be a cultural shift of celebrating by spending time together.
After visiting a cafe for the first time, residents reportedly commented that “It’s surprisingly nice because you can talk quietly.” Their perception of this space—previously considered unsuitable for leisure amidst busy lives—changed after actually experiencing it for themselves. The growing popularity of cafes as a space where two people can sit face-to-face and share a private conversation may seem like a minor development, but it is not insignificant.
People’s perceptions and behaviors don’t only change when systems or policies are altered; shifts in how individuals interact and go about their daily lives is also a catalyst for change.
The Far-Reaching Influence of K-Beauty

There have also been reports that interest in beauty treatments and taking care of one’s appearance is growing in North Korea, particularly among affluent women. Younger women have taken to dieting, while middle-aged women are spending money on cosmetic procedures like Botox to reduce wrinkles. North Korean beauty standards have historically favored a fuller figure to look healthy, but now there is an emerging preference to look slimmer. According to one source, this is due to the influence of South Korean culture.
Even in South Korea, there is an ongoing debate as to whether striving for a slim body and youthful appearance is a healthy pursuit. Nevertheless, this shift in North Korean beauty habits is notable.
Individuals are seeking change and acting on their own initiative, influenced by external information, rather than following the standards set out by the regime.
However, it must be noted that these developments seem to be more prominent among wealthy women with financial means, as opposed to the entire population.
Pop Culture as a Catalyst for Change in North Korea
The global influence of K-Pop groups like BTS is usually measured by streaming numbers or chart rankings. But the most significant marker of impact might be found in North Korea, where people risk their lives to listen to their songs. Even in the most closed country in the world, there are people who enjoy heartfelt music, shared conversation over a cup of coffee, and self-care.
If you zoom in past the image of North Korea as a bleak, oppressed country, there are millions of people going about their everyday lives. Small cultural shifts and changing attitudes may seem insignificant. But over time, these compounding changes could bring about transformation in North Korea.
Increasing Information Access for North Korean People
As evidenced by these developments, North Koreans are watching foreign media and have a growing awareness of the outside world. At Liberty in North Korea, we believe that access to uncensored outside information is key to increasing forces of change and opening inside the country. Empowered with information access, North Koreans can imagine a different life for themselves and push the boundaries of the regime’s control.
We work with North Korean partners and engineers to develop and distribute tailored technology and content to help more people inside the country safely access uncensored information.
You can help bring truth to where it’s urgently needed.
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SONGBUN | Social Class in a Socialist Paradise

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes...
The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.
So begins Chapter 1 of The Communist Manifesto, written by Marx and Engels and published in 1848. If we take the last paragraph, and change a couple of labels, it perfectly describes North Korea today:
The North Korean society that has sprouted from the ruins of the division of Korea and the Korean War has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.
In fact, the North Korean regime has established 3 new classes divided into 51 categories, and has created what is widely recognized as the most oppressive society in the world. Maybe Marx rests easier now that his portrait no longer adorns Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang; it was taken down before Kim Il-sung’s centenary celebrations in April. The North Korean regime has been extremely intentional at creating and enforcing social classes based on political loyalty and this system, known as songbun (성분), is key to understanding North Korean society as a whole and specifically and the system of oppression which the ruling elite uses to maintain political control. So a new report on Songbun by our colleagues at HRNK, Marked for Life, is a great addition to the literature on NK.
The report describes songbun as a state-directed system of discrimination based on hereditary classes determined by perceived loyalty to the regime. It decides your prospects in almost every area of life, including education, occupation, military service, Party membership, treatment by the criminal justice system, housing, medical treatment, marriage, and even food supply. The individual has no control over this system, their songbun being decided by their family line, making it analogous to discrimination along racial lines. The whole system can be described as a political apartheid, reminiscent of the racial apartheid in South Africa that attracted such international criticism until it ended with the election of Nelson Mandela.
CREATION OF SONGBUN
The songbun system was devised in the early years after the formation of North Korea out of a motivation to protect the Kim regime by isolating and controlling perceived internal political threats. It did this by categorizing every single North Korean resident according to how politically safe or risky they might be. The key factors considered were your ancestors’ socioeconomic background at the time of liberation (1945), their activities during the Korean War (1950-1953), and whether you had relatives in South Korea or China (being connected to the outside world is bad for your songbun).
North Koreans were split into three broad classes:
- Core (핵심), 28% of the population. Includes professional revolutionaries, descendants of ‘war heroes’ who died working or fighting for the North, peasants or those from peasant families.
- Wavering (동요), 45%. Includes people who had previously lived in South Korea or China, those with relatives who went to the South, families of small-scale merchants, intellectuals, practitioners of superstition, etc.
- Hostile (적대), 27%. Includes descendants of landlords, capitalists, religious people, political prisoners, those who had assisted South Korean forces during the Korean War, or were otherwise judged anti-Party or associated with external powers.
The regime keeps a file on every single person above the age of 17 (before that age your details were registered on your parent’s file), and an incredible amount of work goes into creating and regularly updating these records. The data is now managed using the software system “Faithful Servant 2.0.” This digitization makes it easier for authorities to access any citizen’s songbun file from any Ministry of Public Security computer terminal from provincial to county levels.
EFFECTS OF SONGBUN
Songbun is deeply entrenched in North Korean society and affects nearly all aspects of a North Korean’s life, including (see HRNK’s full report for further details):
Occupation:
In NK, you do not choose your job. The regime chooses it for you, and it is heavily influenced by your songbun. Simply put, if you have low songbun, you will be put into gruelling manual work, whereas if you have high songbun, you might expect a relatively cushy Party cadre position. There is no element of meritocracy here and ability does not factor in much, meaning that it is quite possible that more able workers are placed in less important roles while less able workers are given positions of responsibility. This failure to efficiently utilize their national talent-pool is yet another reason why North Korea’s state-controlled economy struggles so much.
Education:
Again, this is not meritocratic. If your parents have good songbun, then you are allowed to progress. Otherwise, no matter how hard you study, you will not advance academically. As you can imagine, this can cause resentment (although that resentment is sometimes aimed at the parents, not the regime). This system also ensures that “elites play together.” Those with good songbun go through the same schools and the same colleges, and they network within this pool for their future mutual benefit. Those with bad songbun are of course denied such opportunities. The importance of personal connections in North Korean society compounds the importance of songbun.
Family:
Knowing the importance of keeping a clean record in NK society, parents impress on their children the importance of not doing anything to step outside the Party line, as it would affect the whole family. The importance of songbun also means it is one of the most important factors to consider when finding a spouse. If you marry someone of lower songbun you and your children will lose out, so people tend to marry within their songbun level, as indicated by the occupation and status of their partner’s family. (Note that these phenomena are not unique to North Korea, as people tend to marry within their own social class in other countries too. What is unique in North Korea is how this is being played out within a class system which has been systematically created according to the interests of the ruling elite.)
Internal Exile:
For decades, the regime has systematically exiled tens to hundreds of thousands of low-songbun political undesirables to isolated and unfavourable mountainous areas in the northeast of North Korea. Here they have been forced into hard labour, subject to tighter controls, excluded from population centres, and effectively removed as a potential political threat. It could be argued that the regime has not only tried to cut off the outside world but is now increasingly cutting off Pyongyang from its outer provinces, leaving those who are judged as potential political threats isolated and with no way to demonstrate their frustration without risk of complete elimination.
Food:
Songbun has a huge effect on a North Korean citizen’s food supply. Particularly at times of scarcity, the distribution of food and resources has been concentrated to the higher songbun levels - Pyongyang and central regime institutions (Party, government and military). This was particularly noticeable during the famine of the 1990s and the chronic food shortages that have blighted the people ever since. When the state-economy collapsed and there were not enough provisions to go round, the regime stopped providing food to the politically undesirable northeast regions, so the famine hit those regions the hardest. It has been reported that as many as 30% of the population died in the worst affected regions, particularly North Hamgyeong Province. It should come as no surprise then that around 60% of North Korean refugees who have made it to South Korea are also from that province. An issue for another post is how this demonstrates the inextricable linkage between human rights and humanitarian / economic issues in North Korea. Understanding songbun should call us to question the wisdom of distinguishing between “economic migrants” and “political refugees” when it comes to this population.
Medical Care:
The public health system all but collapsed in the 1990s, but special treatment is still available for elites in Pyongyang. People of lower songbun cannot access these facilities, even if they have independent wealth, and the best they can hope for is to buy medicine on the black market.
In short, songbun institutionalizes the dominance of the ruling elite and their descendants over all other groups in society, and as this system has been implemented over several decades, the privileges of the core class have grown while the others suffered.The operation of this system is not at all transparent but people are generally aware of it, although they may not know details, including of their own songbun. Quite a few of the North Korean refugees that I have interviewed about their songbun have not been very sure about their own level. People of higher songbun are better aware of the system, and one gentleman that I interviewed jokingly half-boasted to me that his family was “totally red, the core of the core.” To him it was clear that he had good songbun because so many of his relatives held positions of responsibility within regime institutions, and some members of his family had also been granted considerable educational opportunities.
It is worth noting that while it is extremely difficult to improve your songbun, you can easily drop levels if you get in trouble through committing criminal or political offenses, or fail to cooperate with regime officials, or if a family member gets into such trouble. The implementation of songbun therefore creates considerable fear and forces people to obey the regime, and in reality it is an effective tool used by the regime to maintain control and power.
As we might expect, the changes inside North Korea over the last 15 years have affected the implementation of this system, albeit without being able to overturn it. The interaction between marketization and songbun (both mitigating and exacerbating effects), songbun’s effect on anti-regime sentiment, and the extent to which the songbun system can constrain change in North Korea will be covered in the next blog post…

SOKEEL J. PARK | Research & Policy Analyst




