The Most Dangerous Contraband in North Korea Isn’t a Weapon. It’s a Wish.
By: Jihyun Kang
Growing up in North Korea, Jihyun took inspiration from the smuggled South Korean dramas she watched to create her own unique clothing. After reaching freedom in 2010, she has continued to pursue her interests in fashion and culture as a catalyst for change. She runs several business ventures, practices fine art under the name “Da Gyeol,” and works with the Ministry of Unification as an advisor. She’s pursuing her Masters in Entrepreneurship, Dept. of Future Science & Technology Business, at Korea University.
I grew up in North Korea, and at fifteen, I encountered a Westerner for the first time at the top of Mount Paektu. He stood over 190 centimeters tall with a thick beard, wearing ripped jeans and a frayed T-shirt. In North Korea, worn-out clothing was a symbol of deprivation. Yet my father whispered, "He is wearing that for style." With that single remark, the worldview I had been taught, began, the first time, to crack. And I thought: I want to dress like that, too.
Fashion is more than clothing. It is the moment when individual desire moves faster than collective command. People follow taste before ideology, and express themselves through what they wear long before any political declaration.
A state can enforce a dress code, but it cannot manufacture desire. That is why North Korea's fear of blue jeans was not irrational—it was the regime recognizing, however dimly, that something it could not control was already growing.
Clayton Christensen, a professor at Harvard Business School, argued that transformation always begins at the margins—in forms so crude and insignificant that those in power dismiss them entirely. Christensen built his theory around corporations, but the logic applies to any system that holds a monopoly over its people, including a state. North Korea's regime was so focused on maintaining ideological control at the centre that it ignored what was happening at the bottom.
That bottom was the jangmadang—the spontaneous, bottom-up market ecosystem created by ordinary people to survive after the collapse of North Korea's state-led distribution system. When that system imploded during the Arduous March—a famine in the mid-1990s that killed hundreds of thousands—people built informal markets out of sheer necessity: not revolution, not ideology, but survival. Yet by 2018, a CSIS study found 436 officially recognized markets operating across the country. What began as a desperate improvisation had quietly become the infrastructure keeping North Koreans alive.
These markets did not merely sell food. They became conduits for Chinese clothing, USB drives loaded with South Korean dramas, and glimpses of a world no one had taught them existed. When a system ignores what people actually want, the market finds the gap.
The act of choosing—what to eat, what to wear, what to watch—may seem trivial. But a person who has tasted choice cannot fully return to obedience.
The jangmadang was the first place where North Koreans learned they could survive without the state. That desire did not stay underground—it surfaced. People began wearing jeans, dyeing their hair, and pulling on T-shirts printed with foreign letters. The regime could no longer ignore it. Authorities branded jeans and Western fashion as 'anti-socialist infiltrations' and deployed street patrols. Teenagers caught in these sweeps were sent to re-education camps; in severe cases, their names and home addresses were read aloud on state broadcasts as public shaming (Radio Free Asia).
In 2024, state-run Korean Central Television went so far as to blur the jeans worn by British TV presenter Alan Titchmarsh during a broadcast. The ruling party's official newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, warned that a country could 'become vulnerable and eventually collapse like a damp wall' if it failed to preserve its own way of life (Newsweek, May 2021).
Regulations cannot extinguish human desire; they only raise the price of the forbidden. This is the inflection point Christensen identified: by the time an incumbent recognizes the threat, it is already too late.
To date, more than 34,000 North Koreans have resettled in South Korea (South Korean Ministry of Unification, 2024). At the start of each of those journeys, there was something like my pair of jeans—not ideology, but desire; not a declaration, but a taste; not revolution, but the market.
No government in history has ever successfully suppressed the human impulse to trade, to choose, to want more. Not the Soviet Union. Not Cuba. Not Mao's China. North Korea will not be the exception.
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Jihyun is a participant of the LiNK English Language Program (LELP), which serves to not only help North Korean defectors build confidence and skills in English, but develop their capacity as advocates for this issue. To that end, we partnered with select LELP “columnists” to write and polish personal essays through multiple rounds of external feedback and revision. Our goal is to have more North Koreans share their stories directly and lead efforts to change the narrative.
We believe the North Korean people can achieve their liberty in our lifetime.
Opportunities like LELP invest in the people building that future now. Help more North Koreans find their voice, reach their goals, and lead change on this issue.
North Korean Soldiers in Russia-Ukraine War
Insights from LiNK’s Chief Strategy Officer, Sokeel Park
Since the end of last year, there have been multiple credible reports of a significant number of North Korean troops being killed and wounded while fighting against Ukrainian forces in Kursk. More recently, there have been media interviews with two North Korean POWs' being held in Ukraine and reports of additional reinforcements being sent to Russia. Kursk is a Russian region bordering Ukraine where Ukrainian forces have held territory since last summer, aiming to change the dynamics of the war and hold a bargaining chip for peace negotiations.
These North Korean soldiers were sent to Russia by Kim Jong Un last autumn as part of his support for Putin’s war. In return, Russia is thought to be providing North Korea with oil, military technology, food and cash.
Kim Jong Un’s Goals and How The World Can Respond
Since the first reports of this unprecedented deployment of over 10,000 North Korean troops to a foreign war we have been in discussions with the Ukrainian Embassy in Seoul, the US government, and Ukrainian civil society representatives regarding policy recommendations and potential responses.
Whilst it is clear that Kim Jong Un does not care about the tragic loss of life of young North Korean men in the trenches of Kursk, he does care about maintaining control over North Korean people’s information environment.
At every opportunity we will continue to encourage relevant governments to increase information access initiatives with strategic messaging targeting North Korean troops in Russia, overseas North Koreans, and audiences inside North Korea. The objectives are to decrease North Korean soldiers’ willingness to fight for Putin, encourage surrender and defection, prevent avoidable loss of life, and increase political costs for Kim Jong Un to continue his military support for Putin.
Treatment of North Korean POWs
We also call on the media to protect the rights, dignity and identity security of any captured North Korean POWs who may be made available for interviews. The North Korean military does not educate its soldiers on its rights as POWs, and information released through such interviews may endanger the soldiers themselves and family members back in North Korea. The Geneva Convention also protects POWs against being subject to public curiosity, meaning interviews must be truly voluntary with fully informed consent, and not exploit the POWs status or conditions. We have discussed these issues directly with relevant journalists, but it is regrettable that in the race to be first some media’s ethical standards have dropped.
The Future of North Korea
The North Korean government’s threats to international security are real, and they dominate the news headlines regarding the country. But we should remember that the North Korean soldiers dying on the battlefield come from the same communities as North Koreans that have come to freedom with us, are now enthusiastically learning English in Seoul, advocating for North Korean human rights at the UN, and working with us to challenge the North Korean government’s control over information.
It will only be when North Korea opens up and all North Korean people gain their basic freedoms that North Korea can have leadership that values North Korean lives. When that happens all of these issues, including the North Korean government’s threats to international security, can be resolved. Thank you for your ongoing support for this vision.
You can learn about human rights violations in the North Korean military in this report by our colleagues at NKDB. Download the full report at the bottom of the page.
